Week 18 · lesson
Lesson 3: Diagnose the Seeded Faults
Harborview is configured.
Now it starts behaving like a real environment.
Something changes. A user notices a symptom. One part of the system stops meeting the requirement while other parts keep working.
That is the point of the seeded faults.
You are not being tested on whether you recognize the title of the lesson where the answer first appeared.
You are being tested on whether you can use surviving function to locate the failure.
Use the capstone incident model
For every incident:
user report
↓
scope
↓
last known change
↓
known-good boundaries
↓
first failed / uncertain boundary
↓
question-driven evidence
↓
strongest theory + competing theory
↓
controlled action
↓
rollback / recovery
↓
verification
Do not start with the fix.
Start with the system.
Incident 1: workstation stops completing POST after a memory change
User report:
One workstation turns on, but there is no normal startup screen.
Supplied evidence:
before change: workstation booted normally
recent change: additional memory module installed
power LED: on
fans: spinning
monitor/cable: verified elsewhere
POST completion: not observed
motherboard diagnostic indicator: DRAM
new module: correct DDR generation, full compatibility not yet proven
What the evidence gives you
The system receives some power.
The display equipment is known-good elsewhere.
The machine has not completed POST.
A memory change happened immediately before the failure.
The board is reporting a memory-related initialization problem.
Windows has not earned a place in the theory yet.
Strong first path
- power off safely;
- verify module and board compatibility;
- inspect recommended DIMM population;
- verify seating;
- restore the last known-good memory configuration when appropriate;
- retest POST.
Competing theory
A motherboard or memory-slot fault remains possible.
What would make that theory stronger?
If the known-good original memory configuration still fails in a previously working slot, the changed-module-only theory becomes weaker.
Do not call the new DIMM defective merely because the failure appeared after installation. It could be incompatible, mis-seated, or placed incorrectly.
Harborview · faulted
A seeded fault changes one bounded state
Keep known-good paths visible while evidence isolates the failed boundary.- 01Observed symptom
Record the exact failed service and affected scope.
- 02Known-good paths
Preserve evidence for services and devices that still work.
- 03Unknown boundary
Test from nearest known-good point toward the failure.
Harborview service environment: isolate the failing boundary
Use the Week 18 client environment as one connected service system. Trace the affected path before changing hardware, networking, operating-system, security, or service state.
What do you expect to keep working, and where do you think the path will stop?
Read the topology as text
- Client desktop: wired learner workstation
- Managed mobile: Wi-Fi + MDM + cloud identity
- Switch: wired local path
- Access point: wireless local path
- Router / firewall: gateway and policy
- MFD printer: print + scan service
- Practice VM: bounded support workload
- Cloud productivity: identity, mail, storage
- Client desktop → Switch: Ethernet
- Managed mobile → Access point: Wi-Fi
- Switch → Router / firewall: LAN / gateway
- Access point → Router / firewall: wireless LAN
- Switch → MFD printer: print/scan path
- Switch → Practice VM: support network
- Router / firewall → Cloud productivity: remote service
Separate host reachability from service reachability
The host responds, but the application port is closed. Inspect listening sockets, start one simulated service, and verify the application path.
Ghostty Web renders the terminal, but this lesson still uses a controlled Robotnix command engine. No unrestricted operating-system shell is connected.
ping -c 2 192.0.2.20ss -lntcurl -I http://192.0.2.20:8080systemctl --user start helpdesk-demo
Read a deterministic terminal transcript
This fallback runs the same bounded Robotnix simulation against the suggested command sequence. It does not connect to an operating-system shell or network.
Robotnix service-port simulation This is deterministic lesson state, not a real host or service. $ ping -c 2 192.0.2.20 64 bytes from 192.0.2.20: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.9 ms 64 bytes from 192.0.2.20: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.8 ms $ ss -lnt State Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address:Port LISTEN 0 128 127.0.0.1:22 $ curl -I http://192.0.2.20:8080 curl: (7) Failed to connect to 192.0.2.20 port 8080: Connection refused $ systemctl --user start helpdesk-demo Started helpdesk-demo.service in simulated state.
Incident 2: valid network path, failed DNS
User report:
The class portal is down.
Evidence:
wired link: up
IP configuration: valid
gateway: reachable
remote documentation IP: reachable
portal IP: reachable
portal hostname lookup: fails
The phrase portal is down is already too broad.
The endpoint can reach the remote IP.
The first failed service is name resolution.
Useful evidence
- configured DNS server;
- supplied query result;
- expected portal record;
- local static name override where applicable.
Irrelevant first move
Replacing the Ethernet cable.
The same cable is already carrying successful routed IP traffic.
Verification
- hostname resolves to the expected address;
- portal opens by name;
- required login/application function works.
Incident 3: printer is healthy, one workstation cannot print correctly
User report:
The front-office printer is broken from this computer.
Evidence:
printer internal test page: correct
other workstations: print normally
printer network: reachable
problem workstation: jobs go to old/stale queue
new approved shared queue: available
The printer is not the strongest failure boundary.
It creates correct pages and other clients use it normally.
The affected workstation's queue/configuration is the narrower boundary.
Controlled correction
Remove or replace the stale mapping according to the approved support procedure and connect the workstation to the intended shared queue.
Verification
Print the same supplied test document from the affected workstation.
Do not stop because the queue icon appears.
The user needs paper output.
Incident 4: display/application regression after an approved update
User report:
The graphics application stopped working after yesterday's update.
Evidence:
Windows boot: normal
other apps: normal
problem app: crashes during plugin/graphics initialization
recent change: approved driver or plugin update
application log: identifies updated component during failure
previous approved version/configuration: available
The scope is narrow.
The timing is strong.
The change record gives you a rollback path.
Strong theory
The updated component introduced a compatibility regression in the affected application path.
Controlled action
Use the approved rollback procedure for the implicated driver/plugin.
What would weaken the theory?
If the old version is restored and the same failure remains unchanged, the update-only theory loses strength.
Record that result instead of escalating the destructiveness of the fix just to produce movement.
Incident 5: managed mobile synchronization disabled by policy/configuration
User report:
My phone stopped syncing. Remove the management profile so it works again.
Evidence:
Wi-Fi: connected
IP/gateway: valid
cloud sign-in: successful
other approved cloud services: available
recent MDM/profile update: yes
required sync feature: disabled by supplied policy state
The local network and account are already proven well enough to reach the cloud service.
The failed requirement is controlled by the management configuration.
Bad fix
Remove MDM.
That solves one symptom by destroying the management boundary.
Better response
- verify what the intended policy should be;
- document the mismatch;
- correct or escalate the specific profile setting through the approved management path;
- verify sync returns;
- verify the device remains enrolled and compliant.
Incident 6: unexpected MFA prompts
User report:
My phone keeps asking me to approve sign-ins. Turn MFA off.
Evidence:
user is not initiating sign-ins
multiple MFA prompts: observed
prompts denied/not approved
normal account access: still available
endpoint malware evidence: none supplied
account-security escalation path: available
MFA is not the problem.
MFA is exposing the problem.
What is proven
Unexpected authentication attempts reached the approval stage.
What is not proven
- endpoint malware;
- password theft;
- identity-provider compromise;
- who initiated the attempts.
Defensive path
Follow the approved account-security process: preserve the timing/alert evidence, review account/session state, protect or reset credentials when authorized, revoke suspicious sessions where required, verify expected sign-in, and leave MFA enabled.
Incident 7: VM cannot reach the internet
User report:
The practice VM has no network.
Evidence:
host network: healthy
host internet: healthy
VM boots normally
VM virtual NIC: connected
VM network mode: host-only/internal
other host-only peer communication: works
client requirement: external access is now required for approved exercise
The virtual network is not necessarily broken.
It is doing what host-only networking is supposed to do.
The configuration no longer matches the requirement.
Controlled change
Move the VM to the approved external/NAT/bridged model defined by the lab, with authorization and awareness of the exposure change.
Verification
Test both:
- required external destination works;
- any required isolation boundary still behaves as designed.
“Internet works” is not enough if the VM was also supposed to remain separated from another network.
Incident 8: low/degraded storage affects application performance
User report:
The file service and application are slow today.
Evidence:
network latency: normal
CPU: normal
RAM: normal
storage free space: critically low
application log: write failures/timeouts
optional scenario variation: RAID/controller degraded state
The user experiences performance.
The system evidence points toward storage.
Strong questions
- Is the problem capacity, health, or both?
- Which data is consuming space?
- Is backup current?
- Is the degraded member identified?
- What action is safe without destroying recoverable data?
Do not delete files because a directory looks large.
Find the owner and retention/recovery requirement first.
Incident 9: approved change causes a compatibility regression
User report:
The update fixed the original problem, but the reporting application no longer works.
Evidence:
change ticket: approved
baseline: documented
backup: verified before change
new version: installed successfully
original defect: resolved
business-critical reporting app: incompatible
rollback package/configuration: available
maintenance window: still open
The deployment tool may say success.
The change is still unacceptable because the business requirement failed.
Correct operational response
Use the documented rollback.
Then verify:
- the previous supported state is restored;
- the reporting application works;
- the original defect is reopened/documented rather than falsely marked resolved.
Rollback is not failure.
Rollback is a control working as designed.
Incident 10: backup exists, restore has never been tested
User report:
We have backups, so recovery is covered.
Evidence:
backup jobs: report success
backup destination: available
restore test history: none
client requirement: recover important staff files
Do you have proven recovery?
No.
You have backup-job evidence.
The missing boundary is restore verification.
Controlled recovery test
Use an approved non-destructive test item and restore it to an alternate location.
Verify:
- restored file exists;
- file opens or validates correctly;
- expected version/date is correct;
- recovery steps are documented.
Do not overwrite the production copy just to prove restoration.
The faults cross domains on purpose
Notice how several incidents refuse to stay inside one category.
The no-POST case involves:
- hardware compatibility;
- firmware/POST;
- safe service;
- documentation.
The mobile sync case involves:
- networking;
- cloud identity;
- mobile management;
- policy;
- user communication.
The compatibility-regression case involves:
- applications;
- change management;
- backup;
- rollback;
- business requirements.
That is what systems actually look like.
Your assigned incidents
Each learner or team receives at least three incidents.
The set must include:
- at least one Core 1-heavy incident;
- at least one Core 2-heavy incident;
- at least one case where the user report points toward the wrong layer.
For each incident, produce:
incident ID:
user complaint:
scope:
last known change:
known-good boundaries:
first failed / uncertain boundary:
strongest evidence:
strongest theory:
competing theory:
what evidence would weaken the strongest theory:
controlled action:
safety/privacy/authorization boundary:
rollback/recovery:
verification of real requirement:
user explanation:
documentation/escalation:
remaining uncertainty:
Do not optimize for speed
The fastest student is not necessarily the strongest technician.
A five-minute diagnosis that destroys evidence, bypasses policy, or creates a second problem is worse than a ten-minute diagnosis that can be defended.
The goal is not hesitation either.
It is controlled certainty.
Before you move on
By the end of this lesson, Harborview should be back in a working state or have a clearly documented unresolved/escalated state for anything outside local authority.
Next you challenge the repaired environment itself:
- Is the access model still secure?
- Can required data actually be restored?
- Are updates and endpoint controls healthy?
- Does every required client function still work?
A repair is only complete when the whole requirement survives it.
Read it. Prove it.